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Arbitration implicates serious constitutional concerns that
have not received adequate attention in case law or commentary.
Recent litigation in the D.C. Circuit over the constitutionality of the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") represents the
most recent, high-profile example. A centerpiece of NAFTA and its
implementing legislation is an arbitration mechanism that divests
Article III courts of virtually all jurisdiction over countervailing duty
and anti-dumping claims and invests that authority in panels of
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arbitrators whose decisions are subject to virtually no federal court
review.1 A group of American softwood lumber producers, dissatisfied
with the arbitrators' decision, challenged NAFTA's dispute resolution
mechanism on a variety of grounds, including its incompatibility with
Article II.2 The parties ultimately settled the case, perhaps motivated
3
in part by fear of the consequences if a court invalidated the scheme.
As representatives of both Canada and the U.S. government made
clear during oral argument in the D.C. Circuit, a successful challenge
4
had the potential to unravel the entire NAFTA regime.
Had the settlement not been struck, any judicial decision would
have had enormous repercussions for arbitration. If the D.C. Circuit
had held that NAFTA's Dispute Resolution Boards violated Article III,
it would have destroyed a keystone of the legal architecture
supporting America's trade and investment policy over the past
several decades. It also would have jeopardized various other markets,
such as foreign direct investment, that likewise depend on robust
arbitration systems. Alternatively, had the D.C. Circuit sustained
NAFTA's scheme, it would have marked the first time that a federal
appellate court had upheld an arbitral system that provided for
virtually no judicial review by Article III courts. Moreover, it is
unlikely that this holding could have been confined to the
international trade context. Unlike other nations, the United States
does not accord different legal treatment to different types of
arbitration. Given this "one size fits all" quality of American
arbitration jurisprudence, a decision upholding NAFTA's scheme
would have provided an opportunity for similarly constricted judicial

1.
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 87
(1988) (statement of Hon. Sam M. Gibbons, Chairman, Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means); H.R. REP. No. 100-816, pt. 4, at 1 (1988).
2.
Coal. for Fair Lumber Imps., Executive Comm. v. United States, 471 F.3d 1329, 1332
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
3.
See id. at 1332-33 (dismissing case for lack of jurisdiction due to settlement following
oral argument).
4.
See Brief for Respondents at 25, Coal. for Fair Lumber Imps., 471 F.3d 1329 (No. 051366) (arguing that the "binational dispute resolution mechanism was designed to ameliorate
serious frictions between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, and amounts to a bargainedfor element of an agreement among them"); Brief of Respondents-Intervenors the Government of
Canada, the Government of Alberta, the Government of British Columbia, the Government of
Ontario, and the Gouvernement du Quebec at 1, Coal. for FairLumber Imps., 471 F.3d 1329 (No.
05-1366) (asserting that the binational dispute resolution mechanism is a "key element" of
NAFTA).

2008]

ARBITRATION AND ARTICLE III

1,191

review in other areas, such as securities law and employment
5
discrimination.
Does arbitration violate Article III? Despite the critical need for
a coherent theory to answer this question, few commentators or courts
have made serious attempts to provide one. 6 For much of the country's
history, federal courts conveniently could avoid this nettlesome
question.7 Prior to the twentieth century, courts simply declined to

5.
See Belom v. Nat'l Futures Ass'n, 284 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
right to an Article III forum is not absolute and where an individual consents to arbitration in a
futures market employment contract, "he waives the right to an impartial and independent
adjudication"); Desiderio v. NASD, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting a
constitutional challenge to the mandatory arbitration clause in Form U-4 on the ground that the
requisite state action was absent); Geldermann, Inc. v. CFTC, 836 F.2d 310, 311-12 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that Congress intended to require commodity exchange members to submit to
customer-initiated arbitration and that such a requirement did not violate Article III); Cremin v.
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1471 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that
the NYSE- and NASD-mandated arbitration of discrimination claims posed no threat to an
employee's right to an Article III court); Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union,
767 F. Supp. 333, 355 (D. Me. 1991) (holding that the arbitration mandated by the Federal
Railroad Safety Act does not contravene Article III); United Transp. Union v. Consol. Rail Corp.,
593 F. Supp. 1346, 1347 (Reg'l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1984) (holding that Section 714 of the Regional
Rail Reorganization Act provides that arbitration is the exclusive remedy for disputes arising
under the Act). Though not directly relevant to the Article III question, state courts have
entertained and, in some cases, accepted constitutional challenges to arbitration predicated on
state constitutional analogues to Article III. See State v. Neb. Ass'n of Pub. Employees, 477
N.W.2d 577, 580 (Neb. 1991) (holding that statute authorizing binding arbitration violated "open
courts" provision of Nebraska Constitution). See generally R. D. Hursh, Annotation,
Constitutionality of Arbitration Statutes, 55 A.L.R.2d 432, 434 (1957 & Supp. 2004) (discussing
the agreement of the courts that "no constitutional defect inheres in arbitration statutes which
provide that agreements to arbitrate future disputes are valid, enforceable, and irrevocable").
6.
For literature addressing the relationship between commercial arbitration and Article
III, see Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster:The Unconstitutionality of BinationalArbitral
Review under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1455,
1456-57 (1992); Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Supranational Judicial Review, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 833, 842 (2007); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial,
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 78-80 (1997); Vicki Zick,
Comment, Reshaping the Constitution to Meet the Practical Needs of the Day: The Judicial
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 247, 249 (1998). For a sampling of the
broader literature addressing various constitutional aspects of arbitration, see Edward Brunet,
Arbitration and ConstitutionalRights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 81 (1992). The United States Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel has released an opinion addressing some of the
constitutional complications attendant to binding federal arbitration involving the federal
government. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to John Schmidt,
Associate Attorney General, Constitutional Limitations on Federal Government Participation in
Binding Arbitration (Sept. 7, 1995), reprinted in 7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 23 (1996).
7.
On at least one occasion, the Supreme Court has considered the compatibility of the
Federal Arbitration Act with Article III, but the issues explored here were not squarely
presented. In Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, the Court held that Congress could, consistent
with Article III, grant federal courts sitting in admiralty the remedial power to order specific
performance of arbitration agreements. 284 U.S. 263, 277-79 (1932). Dreyfus did not explore
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enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements as unenforceable attempts
to appropriate their jurisdiction.8 From the early decades of the
twentieth century (with the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA") 9 in 1925) through the 1960s, the non-arbitrability doctrine
prevented arbitrators from resolving issues of federal statutory law. 10
Notably, while both of these doctrines minimized the tension between
arbitration and the Constitution, neither was anchored in Article III.
Instead, the "jurisdictional ouster" argument found its roots in
contract law-essentially treating the arbitration agreement as a void
contract that offended public policy." And the "non-arbitrability
doctrine" operated as a statutory interpretation tool that refused to
interpret the FAA to deprive a plaintiff of a federal forum on his
12
statutory claim.
Doctrinal developments since the early 1970s, and particularly
in the last two decades, have eliminated the tools that enabled the
Court to sidestep the tension between arbitration and Article III. In
1974, the Court held in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. that parties could
agree to arbitrate a federal securities claim in an international
arbitration. 13 More recently, in a line of cases beginning with
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court
extended the Scherk principle to the domestic context. 14 This line of
cases has made arbitration a viable (and increasingly popular) method
for resolving a variety of disputes "arising under federal law," even
though those disputes fall under a core jurisdictional grant of Article
III. As Judith Resnik recently observed, "federal judges who once had
declined to enforce ex ante agreements to arbitrate federal statutory

whether the limitations on federal judicial review of arbitral awards also comported with Article
III. I thank Chris Drahozal for bringing this case to my attention.
8.
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 993 (3d ed.
1996); 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 4.3.2.2 (Supp. 1999); Sabra A. Jones,

HistoricalDevelopment of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240,
256 (1928).
Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
9.
(2000)).
10. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 245-47 (2d ed. 2001)
(discussing the historical development of the non-arbitrability doctrine).
11.

1 MACNEIL ETAL., supra note 8, § 4.3.2.2.

12. BORN, supranote 10, at 246.
13. 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974).
14. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220, 238 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
625-28 (1985).
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rights now generally insist on holding parties to such bargains,
15
thereby outsourcing an array of claims."
As the jurisdictional ouster and non-arbitrability doctrines
have waned, the unresolved Article III issues have grown in
importance. While they have been simmering in the lower courts for
several years, the pot finally boiled over in the Canadian Softwood
Lumber litigation. 16 Settlement, however, enabled the question to go
away for now, but the need for a coherent theory endures.
The traditional theory used to explain arbitration's
compatibility with Article III rests on the principle of waiver. In brief,
parties entering into an arbitration agreement have waived their right
to a federal forum, thereby eliminating any Article III concern. Part I
of this Article demonstrates that waiver theory no longer can
adequately reconcile arbitration with Article III. Waiver theory
overlooks significant structural concerns presented by arbitrationconcerns that threaten Article III values. These structural concerns
take two forms. First, in cases of voluntary arbitration (i.e., mutual
submission of a dispute pursuant to an arbitration agreement), the
FAA diminishes the power of the federal judiciary. It does so by
mandating that federal courts confirm arbitral awards as judgments
(subject to a few non-substantive exceptions). In presenting this
strand of the argument, I debunk the common misconception that
arbitration is no different than a settlement agreement-a premise
central to the waiver account. Second, in cases of mandatory
arbitration (such as the required submission of a dispute to
arbitration under NAFTA), arbitral schemes potentially aggrandize
other branches' powers at the expense of the judiciary. Here, the
waiver account obviously has no explanatory value, for the parties
have not opted into arbitration. Thus, Part I concludes on the premise
that arbitration implicates serious structural values underpinning
Article III-values that the traditional account is unable to
accommodate.
Part II offers a fresh approach that pays closer attention to
these structural concerns. It draws on appellate review theory to
provide a more promising approach for reconciling arbitration with
Article III. At its core, appellate review theory argues that a nonArticle III decisionmaking mechanism is constitutional, so long as an
15. Judith Resnik, Procedureas Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597 (2005); see also
Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming,Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class
Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 393-96 (2005) (describing the ascendancy of an "arbitration
hegemony" over federal statutory claims).
16. Coal. for Fair Lumber Imps., Executive Comm. v. United States, 471 F.3d 1329, 1332
(D.C. Cir. 2006).

1194

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4:1189

Article III court has a sufficient opportunity to review the decision. 17
Initially, the paper explains why appellate review theory, first
developed in the administrative law context, supplies a helpful
analogy for arbitration. After justifying the analogy, I consider the
core question-what constitutes a "sufficient opportunity" for Article
III review. In its original formulation, appellate review theory
prescribed a single standard of constitutionally required review across
all cases: plenary review of all legal questions (constitutional and
nonconstitutional) and, with a few exceptions, minimal review of
factual findings.18 By contrast, this paper proposes that the standard
should vary along two axes-the voluntariness of the dispute and the
presence of the sovereign in the dispute. This modified appellate
review theory is entirely consistent with the original theory's
underlying premises and does not upend much existing precedent.
Under this modified balance, appellate review theory counsels in favor
of plenary Article III review of an arbitrator's rulings on constitutional
questions, more limited review of nonconstitutional questions, and
minimal review of factual findings.
Part III applies this theory to various forms of arbitration: (1)
private commercial arbitration under the FAA and the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New
York Convention"), 19 (2) arbitrations under NAFTA, and (3)
investment arbitrations. In brief, I conclude that, under the modified
version of appellate review theory offered here, each of these systems
is consistent with Article III. This conclusion is not as sexy as one that
shreds the constitutional fabric of this country's dispute resolution
system. While perhaps anti-climatic, this conclusion is nonetheless
important. The theory offered here puts arbitration on far surer
constitutional footing and provides a blueprint for the design of future
dispute resolution schemes. Part III concludes by responding to
potential criticisms of the theory.
I. AGAINST WAIVER
Traditional dispute resolution theory teaches that disputes can
be plotted along a spectrum. 20 At one end of the spectrum lie simple
17. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies and Article
III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 933 (1988).
18. See id. at 974-91.
19. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
20. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087
(1984) (arguing that settlement generally should not be preferred to judgment because not all
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forms of extrajudicial dispute resolution that do not entail any
intervention by the state, such as a handshake between neighbors to
resolve a minor misunderstanding. At the other end lie complex
disputes between a citizen and the state (or two private citizens) that
can culminate in the forcible deprivation of liberty or property, such as
a criminal prosecution, an administrative hearing, or a civil trial
ending in a verdict. 21 A variety of other forms of dispute resolution,
such as contractual settlements, consent decrees, conciliation,
22
mediation, and arbitration, lie between these poles.
Depending on its position along the spectrum, a particular form
of dispute resolution will entail different procedural protections and
enforceability rules. 23 For example, no formal procedural rules govern
the discussions between neighbors that culminate in a handshake. 24
Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, that handshake is entitled to
minimal judicial enforceability. Conversely, criminal trials and
administrative hearings are subject to a panoply of constitutional and
nonconstitutional
procedural
protections. 25
Reflecting
those
protections, the results of that criminal or administrative hearing
generally are more judicially enforceable than the handshake between
neighbors. 26 These examples yield a predictable principle: a direct
correlation between the procedural protections in a particular system
of dispute resolution and the degree of judicial enforceability of the
27
result.
Certain forms of dispute resolution do not fit neatly within the
pattern described above. This is especially true of arbitration. In
cases are "equal"); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
355 (1978) (explaining that "certain problems by their intrinsic nature fall beyond the proper
limits of adjudication").
21. For a discussion of the varying degrees of formality in systems of dispute resolution, see
Fuller, supra note 20, at 358-59.
22. See Fiss, supra note 20, at 1083-84 (arguing that the drive for settlement often leads to
poorly planned consent decrees that eventually bring the parties back to court); William
Twining, Alternative to What? Theories of Litigation, Procedure and Dispute Settlement in AngloAmerican Jurisprudence:Some Neglected Classics, 56 MOD. L. REV. 380, 382 (1993) (noting that
standard alternatives to litigation such as negotiation, compromise, and mediation often
constitute phases within litigation).
23. I am grateful to participants in the University of Montreal/McGill University faculty
matinee, especially Roderick McDonald, for their insights into this Part of the Article. McDonald
rightly reminds us that arbitration is part of a broader social phenomenon about the distribution
of the social power to resolve disputes.
24. While formal rules may not govern the handshake, informal norms of course might.
25. Fiss, supra note 20, at 1077.
26. See id. (asserting that the presence of a judge can 'lessen the impact of distributional
inequalities").
27. See id. at 1084-85 (describing differences in judicial willingness to enforce consent
decrees depending on whether settlement underpins decree).
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contrast to a full-blown trial, arbitration carries few procedural
protections. 28 Despite this quality, the result of the dispute-the
arbitration award-carries with it a high degree of judicial
enforceability. 29 Indeed, this presumption of enforceability and the
limited degree of judicial review represent some of the defining
features of arbitration. Arbitral awards are subject to far less judicial
scrutiny than a civil court judgment or an administrative
determination, despite the greater degree of procedural protections in
those forms of dispute resolution.3 0 How can this anomaly be
explained?
By far, the dominant explanation in the case law and the
literature is that the parties have waived their right to an Article III
forum. 3 1 The modern-day defense of the waiver argument springs from
CFTC v. Schor, where the Court held that the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission's ("CFTC's") exercise over a common law
counterclaim in a dispute between a customer and a commodities
broker did not violate Article 111.32 Though the case technically did not
involve a challenge to a system of private arbitration but, rather,
adjudication before an independent federal agency, the case has
served as the intellectual foundation for decisions rejecting
constitutional attack on arbitral schemes. Central to the reasoning in
Schor was the idea that Article III had both a personal (and thus
waivable) component as well as a nonwaivable component (which
would be tested against a multi-factor balancing test).33 Critical in the
28. See generally BORN, supra note 10, at 8-9 (discussing both the benefits and the
consequences of arbitration's less formal procedures); Fuller, supra note 20, at 387-89 (explaining
that arbiters usually do not render opinions, often basing their decisions on grounds not argued
or merely mentioned in passing by the parties).
29. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 1126-27 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining that an arbitral award is not a judgment of a
court and noting that the parties must seek judicial enforcement if they do not voluntarily
comply with the arbitration agreement).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Belom v. Nat'l Futures Ass'n, 284 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Where an
individual consents to arbitration, he waives the right to an impartial and independent
adjudication."); Geldermann, Inc. v. CFTC, 836 F.2d 310, 317 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining that,
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, a "follow-on" registrant "explicitly
consents to have his rights determined by arbitration"); Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner
1997) (explaining that, unless the employee
& Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1470 (N.D. Ill.
waived her right to an Article III forum, she would be entitled to "her day in court"); Illyes v.
John Nuveen & Co., 949 F. Supp. 580, 582-83 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that the Form U-4 the
former employee signed incorporated by reference the arbitration provisions later adopted by the
NASD and that the plaintiff effectively agreed to arbitrate certain disputes).
32. 478 U.S. 833, 851-53 (1986).
33. Id. at 848. The Schor Court then articulated a series of factors to determine whether a
particular dispute resolution system crossed the Article III line: (1) whether the "essential
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Court's view was the fact that the parties affirmatively had chosen to
invoke the CFTC, leaving the jurisdiction of the federal courts
unaffected. The Court explained:
In such circumstances, separation of powers concerns are diminished, for it seems selfevident that just as Congress may encourage parties to settle a dispute out of court or
resort to arbitration without impermissible incursions on the separation of powers,
Congress may make available a quasi-judicial mechanism
through which willing parties
34
may, at their option, elect to resolve their differences.

In my view, this passage from Schor, so central to the traditional
account explaining the compatibility of arbitration with Article III, is
deeply flawed in three respects.
First, as a matter of theory, there is a reasonable argument
that Schor was wrong to conclude that Article III rights are
waivable. 35 Schor provides virtually no analysis supporting its bold
assertion that Article III rights are personal.3 6 This is perhaps
unsurprising: all of the constitutional sources point in precisely the
opposite direction. Textually, it is difficult to argue that Article III
confers a personal right. Nothing in the text speaks in terms of a

attributes of judicial power" are reserved to Article III Courts, (2) the origin and importance of
the rights to be adjudicated, and (3) the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the
requirements of Article III. Id. at 851.
34. Id. at 855.
35. See Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative
Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 259 ("The ideals of separation of powers seem to me
structural and political ideals; it is far from clear that they were designed to generate a system of
private rights.").
36. See 478 U.S. at 848-49 (describing Article III's role to preserve the structure of tripartite
government and to protect litigants' personal rights). The Court's analysis consists of nothing
other than the assertion that Article III confers a "personal right" and a citation to a number of
disanalogous precedents on criminal rights-dicta from the opinions in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion) and earlier
decisions that did not confront the "personal rights" question. Schor also cites an article by
Professor David Currie for the proposition that Article III rights are primarily "personal." 478
U.S. at 848 (citing David P. Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16
CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 460 n.108 (1983)).
That citation, however, at best twists Currie's argument and, at worst, is simply wrong.
Sovereign immunity is, by definition, a type of personal privilege that is specific to the litigant
(namely, the state); the doctrine's primary purpose is to protect a private litigant, and, in cases
where the litigant, for whatever reason, does not desire that protection, waiver of the right
makes sense. Currie argues that the tenure and salary provisions serve an analogous function to
the private litigant. But he does not argue that the jurisdictional grants envisioned in Article III
are themselves personal rights, as the Schor opinion seems to imply. Elsewhere he has
acknowledged that "[i]t may be, as several of our most thoughtful judges have argued, that the
requirement of an independent tribunal serves purposes beyond protection of the immediate
parties .. " David P. Currie, The Distributionof Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 19,
39. Even if Schor reads Currie's thesis correctly, it is nonetheless clear, as I explain below, that
Article III, beyond the tenure and salary provisions, serves additional public purposes that are
not confined to the interests of the individual litigants.
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"right" to a decision in a federal forum. Rather, the language speaks in
definitional terms-defining the "judicial power of the United
States." 37 Article III discusses the subjects over which it extends and
the courts in which it is vested. 38 As some have noted, the use of terms
like "shall extend" and "all Cases" could be read to support a
39
mandatory view, at least for some heads of jurisdiction.
Beyond the text, the structure of the Constitution likewise does
not support reading Article III in terms of personal rights. The
opening articles of the Constitution primarily address the structural
organization of our system of government; most of the discussion of
rights appears in the Amendments. 40 A few passages in the initial
articles, such as the Article III, Section 2 guarantee of a jury in
criminal cases, do speak in terms of rights. 41 But those passages
merely prove that, even before the drafting and ratification of the Bill
of Rights, the framers knew how to draft the Constitution in terms of
personal rights. In light of this contrasting language, their failure to
draft the Judicial Power Clause in terms of a personal "right" to a
federal forum supports the inference that this clause never was meant
to confer a personal right.
Finally, the history behind Article III does not support a
"personal rights" theory. 42 It is true that evidence of the framers'
intent behind Article III is fragmentary and has prompted much
debate over its meaning. Much of that debate is not relevant for
purposes of this Article. What is relevant are the terms over which the
debate is waged-most commentators focus on questions of the
vertical and horizontal distribution of power, the necessity for inferior
federal courts, the heads of federal jurisdiction, and the scope of
Congress's power to control the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts. The primary sources do not suggest that the
framers drafted Article III in order to confer a personal right on

37.
38.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Id. art. III, §§ 1-2.

39.

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 166-77

(1833); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction,65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 211 (1985). For a critique of originalist interpretations
of Article III, see Michael L. Wells & Edward J. Larson, Original Intent and Article III, 70 TUL.
L. REV. 75, 93-121 (1995).
40.

See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 1.1

(2002).
41. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; see also id. art. I, §§ 2, 9.
42. For an exhaustive discussion of the history behind Article III's development and
adoption, see Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction:A Guided
Quest for the OriginalUnderstandingof Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV.741 (1984).
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anyone. 43 Alexander Hamilton's classic defense of the values
underpinning Article III, in Federalist 78, discusses the provision
primarily in structural terms: "That inflexible and uniform adherence
to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive
to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be
expected from judges who hold their officials by a temporary
commission."44 He also argues that "we can never hope to see realized
in practice the complete separationof the judicial from the legislative
power, in any system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary
resources on the occasional grants of the latter."45 Indeed, the drafters'
failure to include a right to a civil jury trial in Article III was among
the Anti-federalists' great complaints about the Article during the
ratification debate (had Article III included such a right, the inclusion
would have provided important evidence supporting a waiver
theory 46).
Schor never really grapples with this history. Moreover, if
Schor were wrongly decided, that would have substantial implications
for the compatibility of Article III and arbitration. Private parties
would not be able to waive their right to an Article III forum as no
such right would exist! Thus, the first problem with waiver theory is
that it rests on dubious textual, structural, and historical foundations.
The second problem with waiver theory is that it mistakenly
conflates arbitration with settlement. Settlement differs from
arbitration in several material respects. For one thing, in the case of
settlement, the parties know the substantive terms of their bargain in
advance of their agreement to be bound. 47 By contrast, in the case of
arbitration, the parties are bound to their bargain (i.e., an agreement
to arbitrate) before they know its substantive terms. 48 Thus,
arbitration involves less party autonomy than does settlement.

43. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 37-49, 422-33 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911); Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution 325-36, 531-48 (1928).
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). While the above-quoted passage does
refer to "the rights ... of individuals," it would be erroneous to infer from that passage that
Article III rights are waivable. Rather, that reference is better understood to mean that
safeguarding individual rights is one purpose, among many, of an independent judiciary-not
that the independent judiciary itself is a personal, waivable right.
45.

THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton).

46. Clinton, supra note 42, at 801, 803-10.
47. See Fuller, supranote 20, at 406-07.
48. As a matter of consent theory, one might think about the difference between arbitration
and settlement in terms of their different temporal bases. Arbitration is a form of consent to
process at an earlier point in time of a dispute. Settlement is a form of consent to outcome later
on in the dispute. I thank a participant in the McGilllUniversity of Montreal matinee for his
comments on this point.
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Furthermore, most forms of settlement involve greater judicial
scrutiny than arbitration awards. 49 Generally speaking, settlement
agreements are simply a species of contract; before they are enforced,
they are subject to the typical judicial review that precedes an
enforcement decision. 50 Arbitration awards receive much different
treatment. The FAA mandates that federal courts must give effect to
the arbitral award subject to very limited exceptions.5 1 Federal courts
enjoy virtually no power to review the merits of the award but instead
are confined to reviewing the procedures followed by the arbitrator.
52
Whatever review of the merits exists is practically toothless.
Provided that one of the limited grounds for merit review does not
apply, the court must give legal effect to the award and treat it as if it
were a judicial judgment enforceable by compulsion.
The third and final problem with the waiver theory is that it
fails to grapple with the serious structural problems posed by
arbitration. The roots of this problem do not lie solely with Schor.
There, the Court recognized that, in addition to its "personal"
component, Article III also implicates a public concern about the
structure of government. 53 As Schor explained, "[w]hen these Article
III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be
dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that
the parties cannot be expected to protect." 54 Yet despite the Court's
recognition of this nonwaivable feature of Article III, many courts
have rejected Article III challenges to arbitration with a simple
55
statement about waiver and a perfunctory cite to Schor.
This line of reasoning is flatly wrong. While judicial
enforcement of arbitral awards does not directly "aggrandize" the
power of a coordinate branch of government, it diminishes the power
49. See Fiss, supra note 20, at 1084 (describing judicial scrutiny of consent decree in Meat
Packers litigation).
50. See, e.g., Sanford I. Weisburst, JudicialReview of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An
Economic Analysis, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1999) (describing the differing degrees of judicial
deference to party-initiated settlement).
51. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (2000).
52. Very few cases have set aside awards on grounds of manifest disregard of the law. See
Peter Bowman Rutledge, On the Importance of Institutions-Review of ArbitralAwards for Legal
Errors, 19 J. INT'L ARB. 81 (2002). Some cases, for example YusufAhmend Alghanim & Sons v.
Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1997), do not even allow manifest disregard review for
confirmation of New York Convention awards.
53. 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986).
54. Id. at 851.
55. See Sternlight, supra note 6, at 79 ("Just as parties cannot by consent confer subject
matter jurisdiction on a federal court, so too are they prohibited from allowing their claims to be
heard by a non-Article III forum where such waiver would threaten the institutional integrity of
the judicial branch." (footnotes omitted)).
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of the judicial branch. By mandating the enforcement of the award
and controlling the scope of Article III review, particularly the extent
of review of the merits of federal questions, Congress effectively is
stripping federal courts of the power to interpret the meaning of
federal law and erecting a system by which others, namely arbitrators,
can define it. It also effectively is mandating that federal courts treat
the result of this private dispute resolution system as a judgment of a
federal court, with all of the accoutrements that accompany that
judgment.
This separation of powers problem might be analogized to the
constitutional limits on federal commandeering of state executive
officials in cases like Printz v. United States.56 By analogy, Congress
commandeers the federal courts when it mandates that they reduce an
extrajudicial dispute resolution to a judgment. To be sure, the
problems are not identical-whereas Printz involved vertical
separation of powers issues, the problem addressed here involves
horizontal ones. Nonetheless, Printz provides a potentially helpful
analogy, demonstrating how separation of powers principles generally
57
prohibit the commandeering of another branch of government.
58
The Bonner Mall line of cases also provides a helpful analogy.
In these cases, the Court held that parties who settle a case on appeal
are not automatically entitled to the vacatur of the judgment below. 59
The Court's decisions reenforce the public interest in judicial
precedent. Analogously, a congressional requirement that the judicial
branch must reduce arbitral awards to judgment without meaningful
review of the merits deprives the public of valuable precedent. The
analogy here is imperfect. In Bonner Mall, the parties were seeking to
vacate a judgment already rendered; in arbitration, Congress merely
is requiring the courts to enforce the parties' extrajudicial resolution
of the parties' dispute. Nonetheless, Bonner Mall supports the notion
that there is a public interest in a dispute beyond the immediate
interests of the parties and the idea that the public interest can be
60
undermined through efforts to undermine the judiciary's role.
To identify a more significant separation of powers problem
does not necessarily mean that arbitration violates Article III. Rather,
it shows that the waiver account offered by the Schor Court (and

56. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
57. I am grateful to Randy Beck for his thoughts on this point.
58. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
59. Id. at 29.
60. I am grateful to participants in workshops at Willamette Law School and the University
of Georgia for their insights on this point.
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relied on by other courts) is too facile. It does not adequately wrestle
with the underlying constitutional problems presented by arbitration.
I return to these themes in Part II of the Article. However, in one of
the few articles that tackles the inadequacy of the waiver account,
Jean Sternlight suggests that we are resigned to accept the
incompatibility of arbitration with Article 111.61 Sternlight's argument
rests on two premises: (1) arbitration claims typically involve private
rights, 62 and (2) Granfinanciera permits Congress to authorize
adjudication of some private rights by non-Article III actors where it is
essential to further the "relevant statutory scheme." In Sternlight's
view, the only possible "relevant statutory scheme" is the FAA, but
this cannot be the basis for supporting arbitration under Article 111.63
According to Sternlight, while "Congress could pass a statute
requiring that all claims be heard by judges without life tenure,...
[p]resumably, the Supreme Court would reject such a statute." 64 It
follows, therefore, that the FAA is incompatible with Article III.
Sternlight's argument, while an important contribution to the
scant literature on the topic, ultimately does not provide a viable basis
on which to test the compatibility of arbitration with Article III. It
rests on an important premise-that the FAA is the only relevant
statutory scheme. But that proposition does not track the Court's
language in cases like Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products, Co. and NorthernPipeline.
Thomas arose under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). 65 As a precondition for pesticide
registration, FIFRA required registrants to participate in mandatory
arbitration to resolve disputes over the compensation due to a
registrant whose data is subsequently used by another registrant. 66
Congress established the scheme to relieve the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") of the task of resolving compensation

61. Sternlight, supra note 6, at 78-80.
62. The public/private rights distinction traces its roots to the Supreme Court's decisions in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality
opinion), Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), and Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855). The meaning of the distinction has evolved over time. At
one time, public rights involved cases where the sovereign was a party. See Granfinanciera, S.A.,
v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. broke with this tradition by
classifying certain claims as "public rights" even though they arose between two private parties.
473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985). I return to the public/private rights distinction in Part II, infra.
63. Sternlight, supra note 6, at 78-79.
64. Id. at 79.
65. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
66. Id. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(iii).
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disputes, a slow process that had resulted in a backlog of litigation. 67
Federal courts could review arbitral awards from the FIFRA scheme
only for "fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct." 68 Contrary to
Sternlight's reasoning, the Court did not describe the relevant
statutory scheme as the underlying dispute resolution mechanism.
Instead, it characterized the scheme as the mechanism for allocating
69
royalties.
Northern Pipeline adopted a similar approach. There, the Court
considered a constitutional challenge to the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.
That Act conferred extensive powers on Article I bankruptcy judges
and mandated Article III review of their decisions. While a divided
majority found that system constitutionally deficient, it too described
the relevant statutory scheme in terms of the mechanism for
channeling claims by and against the bankrupt estate into a single
proceeding, not the underlying dispute resolution mechanism. 70 To be
consistent, Sternlight should have focused on underlying statutes
whose claims are subject to arbitration (such as Title VII, the
securities laws, the Americans with Disabilities Act, etc.) rather than
the FAA itself.
The second problem with Sternlight's argument is that her
ultimate conclusion-the incompatibility of the FAA with Article IIIdoes not follow from her premise. Even if it were true that the
Supreme Court would strike down a law that stripped federal courts of
jurisdiction over "all claims," the FAA differs from Sternlight's
hypothetical statute in material respects. Specifically, unlike
Sternlight's hypothetical statute, the FAA does not strip federal courts
of jurisdiction entirely. Rather, it defers their consideration of the
dispute and then limits the scope of their review. Indeed, even if
Congress were to strip federal district courts of their power to review
arbitral awards, a constitutional infirmity would not necessarily
arise.7 1 Presumably, such matters would be litigated in the state
courts, and there would be resort to the Supreme Court's certiorari
72
jurisdiction if the case presented a federal issue.
Thus, while Sternlight is right to identify the basic tension
between Article III and arbitration, her critique does not settle the
67. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 573.
68. Id. at 573-74.
69. Id. at 589-94.
70. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84-87 (1982).
71. Compare with the situation in Schor, where the Court said that Congress could not
replace Article III courts entirely with a phalanx of non-Article III judges and vest them with the
complete power to resolve Article III controversies. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986).
72. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87-88 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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issue. Yet, it certainly presents a challenge: Can one construct a
theory that salvages the essential components of arbitration while
putting it on surer constitutional footing vis-a-vis Article III? I begin
to do so in the next Part.
II. ARBITRATION AND APPELLATE REVIEW THEORY
This Part of the Article constructs a theory on which
arbitration might be compatible with Article III. It draws on appellate
review theory to explain how arbitration passes constitutional muster,
provided that an Article III court has an adequate opportunity to
review the arbitrator's award. The first Section argues that appellate
review theory provides the best account for how a dispute resolution
system can be compatible with Article III. The second Section begins
to apply appellate review theory to arbitration but identifies a tension
in the account. The third Section refines appellate review theory to
overcome this tension and provides a modified appellate review theory
by which to judge the compatibility of various dispute resolution
models with Article III.
A. Article III and Appellate Review Theory
Article III scholars long have debated the extent to which
Article III tolerates decisions by non-Article III actors in cases that
otherwise would fall within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. One
ventures into this field at his own peril. As Paul Bator once observed:
"[T]he Supreme Court has been unable, in these 150 years, to find a
coherent and satisfying theory for justifying the existence of
legislative and administrative courts ....

[Its] opinions devoted to the

subject... are as troubled, arcane, confused and confusing as could be
73
imagined."
Some have adopted a literalist framework, according to which
Article III judges, and only Article III judges, may resolve the cases or
controversies arising under the heads of jurisdiction specified in
Article III. 74 Literalist theory may well be appealing as a matter of

first impression. But, as several scholars have noted, there is too much
precedential water under the bridge for such a theory to be viable. 75 As
James Pfander tersely explained in the most recent exhaustive
73. Bator, supra note 35, at 239.
74. See Clinton, supranote 42, 749-50; Currie, supra note 36.
75. See Fallon, supra note 17, at 918-26; see also James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals,
Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 656-60
(2004); Wells & Larson, supra note 39, at 76-78.
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inquiry into the Article III question: "[Wihile scholars continue to hold
up a literal interpretation of Article III as a goal to which the law
might aspire, this approach suffers from serious problems of
institutional fit."76 In some areas, Congress has foreclosed judicial
review in Article III courts. Examples of claims where Congress
effectively has stripped Article III courts of any control include
administrative determinations by the Veterans' Administration, the
Department of Health and Human Services, and the Justice
Department. 77 The Court consistently has approved of these efforts. 78
Adoption of a literalist theory would require invalidation of numerous
non-Article III schemes, including adjudication by administrative
agencies. By parity of reasoning, arbitration could not survive under
literalist theory-the theory would bar arbitrators, as non-Article III
actors, from resolving cases or controversies falling under Article III's
heads of jurisdiction.
An alternative account stresses the Articles III distinction
between "cases" and "controversies," an account originally developed
by Justice Story and later formalized by Akhil Amar. 79 Under the
Story/Amar account, an Article III court must have the jurisdiction to
decide "cases" (including federal questions) but need not necessarily
have the jurisdiction to decide "controversies" (such as diversity
controversies).s8 0 While this theory "has substantial historical
support,"8 1 it too lacks adequate explanatory value in light of
intervening Supreme Court precedent. Adoption of this approach
likewise would require invalidation of federal administrative agency
schemes that allow non-Article III decisionmakers to interpret federal
law and allow Article III courts to defer to those interpretations,
provided that the law is ambiguous and the agency interpretation is
reasonable.8 2 By analogy, the Story/Amar theory would require
invalidation of arbitral schemes, at least to the extent that they
concern claims arising under federal law. Given the large number of
76. Pfander, supra note 75, at 656.
77. See Chen, supra note 6, at 1473-74.
78. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988) (holding CIA director's decision to
discharge employee was not subject to judicial review); Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S.
340, 348 (1984) (holding that consumers of dairy products could not obtain judicial review of milk
market orders); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1977) (finding that the Attorney
General's failure to make timely objection under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is not subject to
judicial review); Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974) (precluding judicial review of
certain Veteran's Administration determinations).
79. See Amar, supranote 39, at 210-19.
80. Id.
81. Chen, supranote 6, at 1467-68; see also Wells & Larson, supra note 39, at 91-93.
82. See Chen, supra note 6, at 1468.
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arbitrable federal claims following the decline of the non-arbitrability
doctrine, the institutional costs of this account are too great.
Recognizing the practical limitations of the literalist and
Story/Amar accounts, appellate review theory seeks, as much as
possible, to salvage the textual and historical underpinnings of those
accounts while not upsetting the existing doctrine.8 3 The theory finds
its genesis in a seminal article by Richard Fallon and traces its roots
to the Supreme Court's decision in Crowell v. Benson.8 4 "The core
claim of [appellate review theory] is that sufficiently searching review
of a legislative court's or administrative agency's decisions by a
constitutional court will always satisfy the requirements of Article
III."85
Fallon derived the theory from a consideration of both the
values supporting non-Article III tribunals and the values underlying
Article III itself. In general, the values supporting non-Article III
tribunals include:
1. Expertise-making the best use of the non-Article III
decisionmaker's substantive expertise;
2. Governmental Functions-maintenance of efficiency and
order in the performance of governmental functions;
3. Flexibility-flexibility in adapting a scheme of
administration and adjudication to changing needs and
political priorities;
4. Fairness-producing fairer and more consistent results;
5. Sovereign Immunity-principles of sovereign immunity
counsel in favor of the government's ability to control
the scope of the non-Article III proceedings in which it is
a party.
According to Fallon, these values must be balanced against others
that underpin the need for Article III tribunals, including:
1.

83.
84.
85.

Separation of Powers-Article III review promotes
separation of powers by ensuring principled decisions on

See Fallon, supra note 17, at 933 (introducing appellate review theory).
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62-65 (1932); Fallon, supra note 17, at 915.
Fallon, supra note 17, at 933.
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legal questions by institutions immune from political
pressure;
2. Fairness-ArticleIII review helps to ensure fairness to
litigants through some combination of the independence
of a life-tenured judiciary plus due process guarantees;
3. Judicial Integrity-this term captures the idea that
judges, through their immunity from political pressure,
can offer their imprimatur of legitimacy on the action of
agencies that have a "hybrid and problematic status in
8 6
our constitutional system."
In Fallon's view, "adequately searching appellate review" of a
federal court action by a non-Article III tribunal sufficiently reconciles
these values and is reasonably consistent with the constitutional text,
framers' intent, precedent, and the underlying purposes of Article III.
Based on this balance of values, Fallon argues that the
necessity and scope of "adequately searching appellate review" turn on
the type of determination. With respect to pure questions of
constitutional law, appellate review theory requires de novo review by
Article III Courts.8 7 According to Fallon, Article III review is necessary
for two reasons: to protect separation of powers principles and to
ensure fairness to individual litigants, particularly where their
constitutional rights are at stake.88 Fallon explains that the review
should be de novo in order to check against the separation of powers
values that are implicated when "another agency of government has
89
strayed beyond constitutional limits."
With respect to pure questions of nonconstitutional law, Fallon
argues that appellate review theory also demands de novo review.
Fallon justifies both the necessity and scope of this review in terms of
a "needed [check] against arbitrariness and self-aggrandizement by
legislative courts and especially by administrative agencies." 90 In
Fallon's view, those agencies are not electorally accountable, are not
insulated from political pressures, are susceptible to capture by

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 937-42.
at 976.
at 975-76.
at 976.
at 977-78.
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''powerful private groups," and "may also have a bureaucratic
tendency to expand their own power." 91
Finally, with respect to findings of fact, Fallon distinguishes

between two kinds of facts. With respect to ordinary findings of fact,
Fallon does not believe that review is necessary, as such findings by a
non-Article III tribunal implicate neither separation of powers
concerns nor fairness concerns. 92 However, with respect to questions of
constitutional or jurisdictional fact, Fallon submits that Article III
courts should have the power, though not the obligation, to review
another tribunal's determination. 93 In Fallon's view, this approach
ensures that Article III courts are able to correct suspect
determinations while avoiding "costly relitigation in the vast run of
94
cases."
Compared with literalism and the Story/Amar account,
appellate review theory best squares with the extant precedent,
prompting James Pfander to note that it has "fared best" among the
modern accounts of Article III. 95 In each of the cases where the Court

has rejected an Article III challenge, the judicial review scheme
preserved partial or full opportunity for judicial review of the nonArticle III decisionmaker's legal conclusions. For example, under
various schemes that the Court has reviewed, the non-Article III
decisionmaker's legal conclusions were subject to de novo review. 96 In
sum, appellate review theory offers the best available tool for
assessing the compatibility of a dispute resolution scheme with Article
III. In the next Section, I explain how the theory applies to
arbitration.
B. Appellate Review Theory and Arbitration
Before delving further into appellate review theory, it is worth
pausing to consider an obvious question. Even accepting the two
premises posited so far-(1) that arbitration presents an Article III
problem and (2) that waiver theory is inadequate-why should we look
to a theory developed in the context of administrative law to supply
the framework for a more coherent theory to reconcile arbitration and
Article III?
91. Id. at 978.
92. Fallon, supra note 17, at 989.
93. Id. at 990.
94. Id.
95. Pfander, supra note 75, at 666.
96. See, e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.
667, 673-74 (1980).
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Two points answer this question and justify the bridge between
administrative law and arbitration. The first is to recognize, as Lon
Fuller did nearly three decades ago, that arbitration and
administrative adjudication are simply different "forms" of dispute
resolution. 97 That is to say, they lie along the same spectrum, just at
different points. The second is to recognize that arbitration, like
administrative adjudication, implicates the structural concerns
developed in Part I. To be clear, the structural concerns may not be
the same, but they both implicate the diminution of judicial power. To
the extent that appellate review theory seeks to set boundaries on the
diminution of that power, it supplies at least a starting point for a
theory (though as I explain later on, arbitration sheds light on how
that theory should be modified).
Despite his acceptance of the relevance of appellate review
theory to arbitration, Fallon does not attempt to apply his theory in
this particular context. His account does, however, offer two
suggestions. Unfortunately, these suggestions are in substantial
tension with each other and complicate an effort to analyze the
constitutionality of arbitration in terms of appellate review theory.
First, Fallon suggests that the constitutionality of an arbitral
scheme turns on the opportunity for federal courts to conduct de novo
review of questions of law. 98 Under this standard, Thomas99 was
wrongly decided. 100 In Fallon's view, the core defect of the scheme in
Thomas was that
[dlecisions of federal law were committed to an arbitrator, whose rulings were subject to
judicial review only for fraud or misconduct. In the absence of judicial review,
investiture of authority to decide questions of law in a non-article III federal
decisionmaker encroaches too deeply on the fairness and separation-of-powers values
101
that article III embodies.

The second suggestion in Fallon's analysis is that the
constitutionality of arbitration turns on whether the parties have
validly waived their entitlement to an Article III tribunal. This
suggestion may be inferred from Fallon's analysis of Schor:

97. See Fuller, supra note 20, at 354-56, 389. The parallels between the two systems do not
end with the issue of judicial review. See Rebecca Hanner White, Arbitration and the
Administrative State, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1283, 1323-26 (2003) (explaining that the two
fields also share synergies over the extent to which courts should defer to the extrajudicial
decisionmaker, whether an arbitrator or an agency).
98. Fallon, supranote 17, at 976.
99. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
100. For a factual synopsis of Thomas, see text accompanying notes 65-69.
101. Fallon, supranote 17, at 991.
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[Schor] thus suggests a question-which would have been presented directly had full
appellate review not been provided-about the legitimacy and effectiveness of waivers of
article III rights in the absence of appellate review. As long as the waiver is not
procured by any form of illegitimate pressure, waiver ought to be held permissible
within an appellate review theory. Waiver substantially alleviates any concern of
unfairness to the parties. Moreover, when both parties are satisfied that the
adjudicatory scheme treats them fairly, there is substantial assurance that the agency is
not generally
behaving arbitrarily or otherwise offending separation-of-powers
10 2
values.

Unfortunately, Fallon's two suggestions offer conflicting
guidance on the constitutionality of arbitration. Had his analysis
ended with his discussion of Thomas, the implications of his theory
would have been quite clear, but also quite fatal for arbitration. Just
like the scheme in Thomas, federal courts are precluded from
conducting de novo review of the arbitrator's legal conclusions. 10 3
Instead, at most, federal courts only review arbitral awards for
manifest disregard of the law-a highly deferential, perhaps toothless,
104
standard on which few awards have been set aside.
By contrast, Fallon's second suggestion potentially salvages
many arbitrations. So long as the parties to an arbitration, like the
parties in Schor, voluntarily submit their dispute to a non-Article III
decisionmaker, the separation of powers concerns diminish. As noted
in Part I.A, most-but not all-arbitrations are voluntary. So, subject
to the exceptions discussed therein, and provided that the undertaking
is truly "voluntary," arbitration presents no Article III problem.
How does one reconcile the seemingly conflicting inferences in
Fallon's analysis? In my view, the flaw lies in the underdeveloped
second premise-the notion that consent to a non-Article III dispute
addresses the separation of powers problem and relieves the need for
"adequately searching appellate review."
Why is this last aspect of Fallon's appellate review theory
weak? First, it is inconsistent with his account of Thomas. One could
equally say that the pesticide applicants in Thomas voluntarily
participated in the FIFRA arbitration scheme when they chose to file

102. Id. at 991-92.
103. See infra notes 120, 153-55 and accompanying text (discussing and differentiating
Thomas from other precedent).
104. See Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards: Manifest Disregard of the
Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 506 (1998) ("Consequently, although most circuit courts have
adopted 'manifest disregard of the law' as a non-statutory ground for vacating or modifying an
award, until recently there have been few cases in which a court has set aside an arbitral award
on this ground."); Noah Rubins, "Manifest Disregardof the Law" and Vacatur of Arbitral Awards
in the United States, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 363, 366 (2001) (desribing this doctrine as "the most
widely-recognized extra-statutory ground upon which courts can set aside arbitration awards
under U.S. federal law").
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the pesticide application. Under the argument inferable from Fallon's
Schor analysis, the voluntary activity should have eliminated any
Article III problem (absent any undue pressure, and there was no
evidence of such pressure in Thomas). How, then, can Fallon conclude
that Thomas was wrongly decided? Either his analysis of Thomas or
his waiver argument is flawed; both cannot coexist in the theory.
More fundamentally, though, Fallon does not explain why
waiver of the right to an Article III forum adequately addresses
separation of powers concerns. As explained above, such concerns can
arise even in cases of waiver. 10 5 By setting the standards of review
narrowly, Congress is curtailing the power of federal courts, despite
the initial voluntary undertaking by the parties.
A more extreme example proves the flaw in Fallon's argument.
Suppose that the scheme in Schor had provided for no federal review
of the CFTC's decision-essentially making the CFTC's ruling on
Conticommodity's counterclaim final and unreviewable. 10 6 If Fallon
were correct, then any separation of powers concerns would drop out
so long as Conticommodity and Schor voluntarily had opted into that
system. Yet under these circumstances, Congress is at least
diminishing the power of the lower federal courts by stripping them of
the ability to review a claim that otherwise might fall within their
jurisdiction. Even the Schor Court might not tolerate such a result
because it would be analogous (though, admittedly, not identical) to
the "phalanx of non-Article III tribunals equipped to handle the entire
business of the Article III courts without any Article III supervision or
control and without evidence of valid and specific legislative
necessities .... "107 Limited federal review presents the same quality of
diminution problems, though perhaps not as extremely as in this
example. It shows, nonetheless, that separation of powers problems
can exist even in a system into which parties have opted.
Thus, despite its significant contributions to scholarship on
Article III, Fallon's appellate review theory does not provide a
completely workable model for testing the constitutionality of
arbitration. At least some refinements of the theory are necessary to
determine the relevance (if any) of consent to the analysis and
whether there are other unique features of arbitration that might
warrant modification of the meaning of "adequately searching federal
review." The next Section supplies those refinements.

105. See supra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
106. Such a law is more than fanciful. Some countries, such as Belgium, have adopted
arbitration laws that bar any judicial review.
107. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986).
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C. Refining Appellate Review Theory
How did appellate review theory end up providing two
conflicting messages about the compatibility of arbitration with
Article III? The root of the problem lies, I believe, in a very deliberate
choice that Fallon made-but did not have to make-when
articulating the theory. Specifically, as described above, Fallon opted
for a single, unbending set of rules governing Article III review,
regardless of the underlying circumstances. In doing so, he rejected an
alternative approach-one that tailors the constitutionally required
degree of Article III review to the particular claim. Fallon concedes
that such an approach would be consistent with appellate review
theory:
An alternative mode of analysis, which would be consistent with the principal
assumptions of [appellate review] theory, would answer questions about the necessity
and requisite scope of judicial review only after weighing
article III values against
108
competing governmental interests on a case-by-case basis.

This more nimble approach has two advantages over Fallon's
uniform standard. First, it reflects the fact that different claims and
different dispute resolution schemes will involve different sets of
values. Take, for example, sovereign immunity-one of the abovenoted values central to appellate review theory. In some arbitrations,
such as commercial ones between purely private companies, those
considerations drop out. In others, such as arbitrations under NAFTA
or bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"), those considerations play a
much more prominent role. Varying the constitutionally required
standard of review with the presence or absence of a factor such as
sovereign immunity would better calibrate the constitutional rules to
the actual values at stake in a particular case. Second, a more
nuanced standard of review also offers better hope of harmonizing the
existing case law. By contrast, Fallon's original theory-once one
accepts the invalidity of his argument on consent-would be fatal to
the constitutionality of most arbitral schemes.
If this more nuanced approach comports with appellate review
theory and offers these comparative advantages, why did Fallon reject
it? Fallon rejected this approach principally on the ground that "a
prescription of ad hoc balancing offers too little guidance about how
balances ought to be struck." 10 9 His choice thus elevates clarity and
predictability over other values that might have supported the more
nuanced standard described above.
108. Fallon, supra note 17, at 975.
109. Id.
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Fallon's choice of the categorical rule over the balancing test is
a familiar one in the annals of jurisprudence. 110 In brief, "rules" offer
the advantage of clarity but often come at the cost of rigidity. For
example, if a rule provides "no entry into the park after 10 P.M.," it
provides clarity, yet it may prevent desirable outcomes (such as an
overnight camping trip in the park). By contrast, multi-factor
balancing tests offer the advantage of adaptability but often are
vague. For example, if a rule provides "drive as fast as the
circumstances demand," few people will be able to discern the
appropriate speed limit, but the rule is nimble enough to accommodate
both the daily commuter and the man racing to the hospital while his
wife is in labor. The lesson from this simple debate-and one that
Fallon inexplicably overlooks-is the need to craft a rule with
sufficient clarity to permit its easy application but also with sufficient
flexibility to permit its adaptation to different circumstances.
In this context, appellate review theory does not force one to
choose between a rigid bright line rule (as Fallon does) and a
completely amorphous ad hoc balancing test (the only other choice
Fallon sees). Rather, appellate review theory admits of a middle
ground-one that remains true to its origins, is sufficiently clear as to
capture the benefits of Fallon's original set of rules, and also is
nuanced enough to reflect the distinct values underpinning a
particular dispute resolution regime. How exactly, then, would such a
system operate?
Recall that appellate review theory is rooted in two sets of
values: one underpinning the benefits of Article III courts and the
other underpinning the benefits of non-Article III tribunals. Thus, to
determine how such a system would operate, it becomes necessary to
revisit Fallon's value balance and to determine how, in the particular
context of arbitration, those values translate.
In certain respects, Fallon's theory translates well. Begin with
the values supporting the use of non-Article III tribunals:
1. Expertise-arbitration potentially offers the specialized
expertise that arbitrators can bring to the dispute;"

110. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
621-23 (1992) (proposing proper relative weights for "rules" and "standards"). For a recent
discussion of the literature, see Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication,
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1092 & n.159.
111. Bruce L. Bensen, An Exploration of the Impact of Mt~odern Arbitration Statutes on the
Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 482 (1995) (noting
that expert arbitrators were a widely perceived benefit of arbitration over litigation); Terry A.
Bethel, Wrongful Discharge:Litigation or Arbitration?,1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 289, 298 ("Perhaps

1214

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4:1189

2. Governmental Functions-to the extent that arbitration
involves purely private disputes, concerns about
efficient government operation drop out; by contrast, to
the extent that arbitration involves public disputes (like
NAFTA claims), this consideration is more salient;
3. Flexibility-arbitrationoffers greater flexibility than an
Article III forum in adapting a scheme of administration
and adjudication. Parties generally are free to tailor the
procedures of the arbitration to their needs; 112
4. Fairness-whether arbitration produces fairer results is
a hotly disputed proposition. A long line of literature
criticizes arbitration precisely on the ground that its
unfair procedures are biased in favor of the party with
the stronger bargaining position. 113 More recent
empirical evidence, however, suggests that arbitration
114
produces fair results;
the most heralded advantage of arbitration over ordinary litigation is the special competence of
the arbitrator."); Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of
Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 43 (1999) (noting that expertise of arbitrators historically has
been regarded as a benefit to arbitration).
112. On the procedural flexibility of arbitration, see Stefano E. Cirielli, Arbitration,
FinancialMarkets and Banking Disputes, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 243, 248 (2003) ("One of the
major advantages of arbitration, in fact, is that the parties can agree to numerous substantive
and procedural aspects, and are entitled to choose an informal and flexible process, which can be
specially adapted to fit their dispute."); Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of
MalpracticeArbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 208 (1996); Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives
to Litigation of InternationalDisputes, 23 INT'L LAW. 187, 197-98 (1989).
113. E.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISp. RESOL. 267 (1995);
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL.
L. REV. 1945 (1996); Gilles, supra note 15, at 399-412; Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision
and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635; Sternlight, supra
note 6.
114. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS (1992),
reprinted in Securities Arbitration:How Investors Fare, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1992, at 79
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B4-7006), WL 781 PLIICORP 19, 79
(finding no pro-industry bias in the context of securities arbitration in industry-sponsored fora);
Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration:A Fair Forum at a Low Cost, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 9
(2003) (statistical analysis of AAA employment arbitrations indicating that they are not
systematically biased in favor of the employer as repeat player); Gary Tidwell et al., Party
Evaluation of Arbitrators: An Analysis of Data Collected from NASD Regulation Arbitrations
(Aug. 5, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the National Meeting of the Academy of
Legal Studies in Business, on file with Vanderbilt Law Review) (finding that parties in NASD
arbitrations believe the fora and arbitrators are fair and unbiased); see also REPORT OF THE
ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
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5. Sovereign Immunity-as with governmental functions,
the salience of this factor turns on the claim. Purely
private claims do not implicate sovereign immunity; by
contrast, public ones-whether under NAFTA or BITsdo implicate sovereign immunity concerns (whether of
the United States, in the case of NAFTA, or a foreign
sovereign, in the case of BITs).
Now balance these values against the ones underpinning the need for
Article III tribunals:
1. Separation of Powers-as discussed above, arbitration
could present separation of powers problems (though
the problem technically is a diminution problem, as
opposed to an encroachment one present in the Article I
court situation). Specifically, Congress diminishes the
power of the Article III courts by vesting their
decisionmaking power in another non-Article III
institution and requiring federal courts to effectuate
those decisions, subject to very limited grounds for
11 5
review;
2. Fairness-this is the flipside of the fairness factor
above. Depending on the state of the empirical research,
arbitration, in contrast to federal litigation, might run a
greater risk of unfairness to litigants. This is the case
particularly in areas where the litigants are of unequal
bargaining positions, and, consequently, the stronger
party might prefer a forum or set of rules systematically
11 6
biased in its favor;
3. Judicial Integrity-arbitration does not present a
problem,
as
Fallon
has
"judicial
integrity"

OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., reprinted in [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,735 (1996) (finding securities arbitration generally "to be a relatively efficient, fair, and less
costly forum for resolution of disputes involving public investors, member firms, and firm
employees").
115. See Federal Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000); New York Convention, supra note
19, art. V.
116. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939 (1999) ("The Hooters rules when
taken as a whole, however, are so one-sided that their only possible purpose is to undermine the
neutrality of the proceeding.").
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conceptualized it, for arbitrators, unlike administrative
agencies, do not have a "hybrid and problematic status
in our constitutional system."
Thus, an analysis of the values underpinning appellate review
theory reveals that they translate well, but that the balance is not the
same as that in Fallon's model. Specifically, at least two values
justifying the need for non-Article III tribunals-government function
and sovereign immunity-drop out in private commercial arbitration
(while remaining present in trade or investment arbitration involving
governments). On the other side of the scale, one of the values
justifying the need for Article III tribunals-judicial integrity-is not
as salient, due to the absence of constitutionally problematic
administrative agencies. The lesson from this analysis is that the
standard for "adequately searching appellate review" may be less
taxing in arbitrations involving sovereigns than in arbitrations
between purely private parties.
The solution, then, is to identify a limited number of factors
based on which the constitutionally required standard of review might
vary. These factors should be robust enough to capture the partially
competing values underpinning arbitration and Article III. At the
same time, they should be defined sufficiently to avoid Fallon's fear of
lapsing into a vague and unpredictable "totality of the circumstances"
test. While my claim here is tentative, I believe that the two critical
values are the voluntariness of the undertaking and the presence (or
absence) of the sovereign in the dispute.
Voluntariness operates as a proxy for fairness. As noted above,
fairness was one of the critical values in Fallon's scheme justifying the
role for Article III courts. In the administrative cases that concerned
Fallon, the parties often will not have opted into the system; instead, a
federal statute typically directs them there. By contrast, in a
voluntary arbitration (like a private commercial one), the parties will
have chosen the preferred forum for resolving their dispute. As a
theoretical matter, that choice signals a mutual faith by both parties,
before any dispute has arisen, that the dispute resolution mechanism
will reach a fair result. Thus, fairness concerns diminish in a
voluntary arbitration and, consequently, so too does the need for
plenary Article III review. Doctrines in a variety of contexts, such as
forum selection agreements, choice-of-law clauses, and consent to
jurisdiction demonstrate a judicial solicitude for such private
choices. 117 By contrast, in a truly involuntary arbitration, such as the
117. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 29.
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BIT arbitrations described below, the fairness concerns remain
dominant and, thus, so too does the need for Article III review.
The sovereign immunity doctrine recognizes the separation of
powers values. As noted above, where a sovereign is a party to the
dispute, the law accords great deference to the political branches to
control judicial jurisdiction. Absent consent, the sovereign cannot be
sued in its own forum. 1 18 Foreign sovereigns' immunity likewise has
remained firmly within the control of the legislative branch-at least
in recent years." 9 Thus, in any case involving a sovereign, the political
branches could cut off judicial jurisdiction almost entirely (whether
through declining to waive immunity or narrowing the scope of
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns). That greater power to cut off
jurisdiction also implies a lesser power to regulate the jurisdiction.
Consequently, Article III values are, in such cases, relatively
120
minimal.
One legitimately may question whether these are the only
values by which the scope of review should vary. Specifically, should
the scope of review also depend on whether the case is an
international one? 12 1 This argument is not without foundation, and at
least two starting points are possible. One starting point could trace
back to cases like Dames & Moore v. Regan.122 Under this line of
argument, treaties will govern most international arbitration cases; as
treaties require cooperation between the executive and legislative
branches, courts should be less inclined to interfere. The other
starting point could trace back to the line of cases suggesting the need
for judicial deference in matters of foreign affairs or foreign
118. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
119. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2000).
120. This explicit consideration of the sovereign's presence in the litigation also helps square
the modified appellate review theory with the public rights doctrine (at least in its original form).
As discussed above, beginning with Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. 272 (1855), the public rights doctrine justified restrictions on the jurisdiction of the Article
III courts in cases where the sovereign was a party. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co. broke with this tradition by classifying certain claims as "public rights" even
though they arose between two private parties. 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985). As Fallon himself
admits, Thomas remains a dubious precedent under appellate review theory and so, too, does it
under the modified form offered here. With the exception of Thomas, the other public rights
cases fit comfortably within my model.
Of course, the sovereign immunity argument can be turned on its head. Arguably, the need
for judicial oversight may be at its zenith precisely when the sovereign is a party in the case. In
such cases, judicial oversight is necessary as a check on governmental overreaching and to
ensure neutral application of relevant legal principles. Such a position, while principled, would
require overruling the public rights cases tracing all the way back to Murray's Lessee and is
beyond the scope of this paper. I am grateful to Michael Wells for his insights on this point.
121. I am grateful to Leila Sadat for her insights on this point.
122. 453 U.S.654 (1981).
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commerce. 123 Whichever starting point is chosen, both arguments yield
the same conclusion: that the scope of constitutionally required
judicial review should be lower in international cases (and conversely
should be greater in purely domestic cases).
Such a course might have been possible at one time.
124
Particularly following its decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, Inc.,
the Court plausibly could have maintained a distinction between
international and domestic arbitration cases. Nonetheless, by the mid
1980s, any attempt to preserve a doctrinal distinction between
domestic and international cases was lost. With cases such as
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the Court
put domestic cases on an equal footing with international ones as a
matter of doctrine. 125 Since that time, it has shown no solicitude
toward efforts to separate the two types of cases. Thus, while this
argument has great theoretical appeal, I ultimately reject it, for it
undermines the theory's explanatory value.
The upshot of this modified appellate review theory is to vary
the degree of constitutionally required review along two axes. At one
extreme lie involuntary private arbitrations. In those circumstances,
the need for Article III review is at its zenith. At the other extreme lie
voluntary
arbitrations
involving
the
sovereign.
In those
circumstances, the need for Article III review is at its nadir. The
intermediate cases are voluntary, private arbitrations and
involuntary, sovereign arbitrations. I depict those axes in the
following table:
Sovereign
Intermediate
Case

Minimum AIII
Review

Involuntary

Voluntary
Maximum
AIII Review

Intermediate
Case
Private

123. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 29, at 601-03.
124. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
125. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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How does this translate onto the different types of issues under
review? With respect to questions of constitutional law, de novo review
still should be required. As to the necessity of review, arbitration does
not affect Fallon's basic analysis: Article III review of constitutional
questions is necessary, both to promote separation of powers
principles and to provide essential fairness to individual litigants
when their constitutional rights are at stake. 126 As to the scope of
review, the analysis admittedly does not map perfectly. Fallon justifies
de novo review of constitutional questions on the ground that
"separation of powers values are deeply implicated" if "another agency
of government has strayed beyond constitutional limits." Arbitration
does not present a situation where an agency of government can act
ultra vires. Nonetheless, anything less than plenary review could
implicate separation of powers concerns animating Fallon's standard.
If Congress could strip Article III courts of their power to review an
arbitrator's findings on questions of constitutional law, such a regime
would undermine separation of powers principles just as much as the
aggrandizement of a federal agency's power. Requiring plenary review
of constitutional questions eliminates that concern.
As to questions of law, translating the modified appellate
review theory is a challenge. In some respects, the reasons justifying
plenary review of legal questions in cases of Article I courts or
administrative agencies do not apply in the context of arbitration. For
example, arbitrators lack the capacity to expand their own power.
Unlike bureaucrats, arbitrators are not necessarily repeat players in a
dispute settlement procedure. Their decisions lack any precedential
force that might be used to justify a more expansive conception of
their power in a later case. Nor are arbitrators subject to political
pressure from another branch of government, as might be the case
with respect to administrative agencies or legislative courts.
At the same time, in at least three respects, arbitrators present
at least some of the dangers that led Fallon to conclude that appellate
review theory required Article III review of nonconstitutional legal
questions. First, just like agencies, arbitrators can be arbitrary. They
can get the law wrong; they also can render "compromise" awards that
leave both parties relatively satisfied but, as a principled matter, lack
a legal basis. Second, while individual arbitrators may lack the
capacity for bureaucratic self-aggrandizement, arbitration as an
institution retains that capacity. As noted above, arbitrators and
arbitral institutions have a direct financial interest in being able to
126. Fallon, supra note 17, at 975-76.
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exercise jurisdiction over a matter-one that may give them an
incentive to take an expansive notion of their jurisdiction in the run of
cases. 12 7 Third, arbitration presents at least some risk of capture by
powerful political entities, albeit in a manner different from the
capture at play in the bureaucratic setting. As I have explained
elsewhere, arbitrators, unlike bureaucrats or- judges, often are
nominated by parties to resolve a dispute, and, critically, their
compensation is tied to their service. 128 In theory, this nomination
process gives the arbitrators a financial incentive to decide a case in
favor of the player most likely to give the arbitrator repeated business,
thereby skewing the result in favor of the more powerful party.
Thus, modified appellate review theory justifies at least some
degree of Article III review of an arbitrator's legal determinations,
though perhaps not as exacting as that required in Fallon's original
model. Some of the values that justify plenary review in the agency or
or
pressure
as
political
court
context-such
legislative
aggrandizement-drop out here. Others, such as arbitrariness,
expansive conceptions of jurisdiction, or capture, remain relevant in
the context of arbitration.
Deference by Article III courts to determinations of federal law
made by other non-Article III entities is a familiar concept. 129 For
example, in administrative law, Skidmore1 30 and Chevron 31 both
allow a federal court to defer to an agency interpretation of an
ambiguous statute. 132 In criminal procedure, both pre-AEDPA and
post-AEDPA case law permit a federal court to defer to a state court's
interpretation of a federal constitutional question. At the same time,
both doctrines permit the federal courts to override the prior
decisionmaker's "unreasonable" determinations. To be sure, the
analogies here are not exact-the former involves deference to another
branch of government (thereby assuring some degree of political
accountability), while the latter involves deference to a different
sovereign's courts (who, as noted above, occupy a different position
than arbitrators). Nonetheless, doctrines like these illustrate that our
127. Courts have some ability to control this tendency toward expansion through judicial
review of the arbitrator's jurisdiction, either at the pre-arbitration stage or at the enforcement
stage. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-47 (1995).
128. Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Theory of Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. L. REV.
151 (2004).

129. I am especially grateful to Laura Appleman for helping me tease out this argument. See
also White, supra note 97 (exploring judicial deference to adjudication).
130. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
131. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
132. See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (discussing degrees of
judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations).
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constitutional scheme can tolerate a limited degree of deference by
Article III courts to another entity's construction of federal law when
some underlying policy reason justifies that deference. Much as the
expertise of an administrative agency or federalism and finality may
justify some deference in these contexts, so too can the promotion of
arbitration support such deference.
Finally, as to factual review, arbitration does not alter Fallon's
analysis, but instead fits quite comfortably with it. Factual findings by
arbitrators, like those of administrative agencies or legislative courts,
present no particular threat to either separation of powers values or
fundamental fairness. As to the special categories of facts warranting
separate treatment-constitutional or jurisdictional-a discretionary
approach ideally balances the need to correct suspect findings against
the desire to avoid costly relitigation of issues.
At this point, it is worth addressing how modified appellate
review theory differs from the present doctrine. 13 3 How much does the
"voluntariness" prong differ from Schor's134 waiver analysis? How
much does the presence of the sovereign in the dispute differ from the
non-waivable aspects of Article III noted in Schor? The synergies with
existing doctrine are unsurprising for, as already noted, one of the
main benefits of appellate review theory (whether in its original or
modified form) is that it remains in harmony with existing doctrine.
Harmony, though, is not the same as duplication, and in at least three
critical respects, modified appellate review theory differs from the
current landscape.
First, modified appellate review theory uses an entirely
different metric from Schor. Whereas Schor uses waiver
categorically-that is to say, a party waives its right to an Article III
forum-modified appellate review theory uses the concept of
voluntariness instrumentally. In other words, while a party's
voluntary submission to an arbitral scheme may affect the degree of
constitutionally required review, it does not affect the need for it. By
contrast, as noted above, some courts relying on Schor to justify the
constitutionality of arbitration have ended the argument with the
waiver analysis.
Second, the structural analysis under modified appellate
review theory differs from the "nonwaivable" aspect of Schor. With
respect to this nonwaivable aspect of Article III, the Court evaluates a
dispute resolution scheme's constitutionality using a multi-factor
balancing test. By contrast, modified appellate review theory tests the
133. I thank Heather Elliott for forcing me to think through this question.
134. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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constitutionality of a scheme by reference to a single metric-the
degree of Article III review-and calibrates the necessary degree of
review along the axes of voluntariness and sovereign immunity.
Third, modified appellate review theory transforms the public
rights doctrine. Some courts have relied on this doctrine to uphold
to
certain arbitral schemes, and the Canadian government relied on it 135
defend NAFTA's arbitral scheme in Canadian Softwood Lumber.
Traditionally, public rights were those claims where the government
was a party or where the government had an actual interest in the
dispute. 136 By contrast, claims exclusively between private individuals,
even when the claims were of statutory creation, were ones of private
right. 13 7 Thomas broke with that tradition when it classified certain
claims as potentially public rights even where the claim arose between
two private parties. Modified appellate review theory rejects this
expansion of the public rights doctrine in Thomas. Instead, its
emphasis on the presence or absence of a sovereign in the dispute
more closely approximates the classic formulation of the public rights
39
138
doctrine in cases like Murray'sLessee and Crowell.1

135. Brief of Respondents-Intervenors, supra note 4, at 27-33.
136. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("In my view a matter of public rights, whose adjudication
Congress may assign to tribunals lacking the essential characteristics of Article III courts, must
at a minimum arise between the government and others." (citation and internal quotations
omitted)). For example, Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., the case that
spawned the public rights doctrine, concerned the government's effort to collect a debt owed by
one of its customs agents. 59 U.S. 272, 275 (1855). Ex Parte Bakelite Corp. concerned a claim
between the government and a private individual over a customs assessment imposed by the
government. 279 U.S. 438, 447 (1929). In both cases, the Court held that the rights were "public
rights." Id. at 452; Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. 283-85. Crowell v. Benson sought to provide a nonexhaustive list of examples including matters found in connection with the congressional power
"as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health,
facilities of the post office, pensions and payments to veterans." 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932). Perhaps
the clearest statement came from the plurality in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co.: "[A] matter of public rights must at a minimum arise 'between the
government and others.' " 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982) (plurality opinion).
137. For example, the Court in Crowell termed a worker's compensation claim by a
longshoreman against his employer a private right, even though federal statutory law created
that claim. 285 U.S. at 51. The plurality in Northern Pipeline classified a state law breach of
contract claim as a private right, even where that claim was wrapped up in a governmentally
created bankruptcy system for restructuring debtor-creditor relations. 458 U.S. at 71. Finally,
the Court in Granfinancieraclassified a bankruptcy trustee's right to recover for a fraudulent
conveyance a "private right," even where the trustee's power to maintain the action derives from
federally created bankruptcy law. 492 U.S. at 55-56. Again, the Northern Pipeline plurality
stated the tradition clearly: " 'The liability of one individual to another under the law as defined'
is a matter of private rights." 458 U.S. at 69-70 (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51).
138. 59 U.S. 272.
139. 285 U.S. 22.
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In sum, appellate review theory provides the most promising
basis for reconciling the tension between Article III and arbitration.
Such a theory vindicates the textual, historical, and policy concerns
underpinning Article III while doing minimal violence to the existing
precedent. The precise degree of review by an Article III court should
not be a rigid, uniform standard, as the original expositor of appellate
review theory proposed. Instead, it should reflect the distinct mix of
values underpinning the dispute resolution system-a methodology
that Fallon acknowledges is consistent with the underlying spirit of
appellate review theory but ultimately dismissed for debatable
reasons. Once that aspect of Fallon's analysis is altered, the proper
standard of review should account for both the voluntary nature of
most arbitrations and the special legal status of an award under a
judicial system. The next Part applies appellate review theory to
determine whether the FAA and other arbitral schemes comport with
Article III.

III. APPLICATIONS AND CRITICISMS
The preceding Part developed a revised version of appellate
review theory as the basis for evaluating the compatibility of
arbitration with Article III. This final Part explores the theory's
implications. It first applies the theory to several arbitral schemes: (a)
private commercial awards under the FAA and New York Convention,
(b) awards rendered by NAFTA Dispute Resolution Boards, and (c)
investment arbitrations. In brief, I conclude that, under the modified
appellate review theory offered here, most forms of private commercial
arbitration, NAFTA arbitration, investment treaty arbitration, and
party-initiated expansions of judicial review survive Article III
challenge. By contrast, the scheme in Thomas violated Article III, and
party-initiated contractions of judicial review should not be enforced.
This Part then anticipates several criticisms of the theory and
explores its implications for related areas of the law.
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A. PreliminaryApplications
1. Private Commercial Awards
Commercial arbitration awards are subject to judicial review
under one of two main frameworks. 140 First, in some cases of
confirmation (reducing a foreign or nondomestic award rendered in
the United States to judgment) and enforcement (reducing an award
rendered abroad to judgment), a multilateral treaty, typically the New
York Convention, will set forth the standard of review.1 4 ' Roughly
speaking, Article V of the New York Convention provides that an
award may be denied recognition or enforcement where:
The parties lacked capacity to enter it;
The losing party lacked adequate notice of the proceeding or an opportunity to be heard;
The award concerns a matter beyond the parties' submission;
The composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure deviated from the parties'
agreement or, absent such agreement, the law of the arbitral forum;
The award has been set aside;
The dispute is non-arbitrable in the country were enforcement is sought;
The award violates the public policy of the country where enforcement is sought.

Second, in cases of vacatur (setting aside an award rendered in
the United States) and cases of confirmation and enforcement not
falling under a treaty, the FAA sets forth the default framework for
judicial review. Section 10 of the FAA provides as follows:
[A district court] may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any
party to the arbitration(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means;

140. For discussions of the law governing the recognition and enforcement of international
arbitral awards, see BORN, supra note 10; BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 29.
141. Less frequently, other conventions may apply. These include the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention), opened for signature
Jan. 30, 1975, 104 Stat. 448, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245 (governing awards in certain Latin American
arbitrations) and, discussed infra text accompanying notes 167-168, the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (Washington
Convention), opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (governing
awards for certain investment arbitrations). The standards of judicial review under the Panama
Convention are virtually identical to those under the New York Convention, so the analysis in
the text applies equally in these specialized contexts.
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(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrations, or either of
them (sic);
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced;
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that
a
42
mutual final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 1

Neither Article V of the New York Convention nor Section 10 of
the FAA expressly provides for any Article III review of the merits of
143
the decision, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds.
Despite the absence of any textual authorization for Article III
review of legal questions, judicial decisions have partly filled the gap,
for courts have constructed a doctrine that, at least arguably,
attempts to mitigate this harsh conclusion. For several decades, the
"manifest disregard of the law" doctrine has enabled federal courts to
take a quick look at the merits of the award (even though that
144
doctrine does not find any formal footing in the text of Section 10).
The formulations of the manifest disregard doctrine vary in slight
terms, and its scope is not fully settled. 145 Under the generally
accepted formulation of the doctrine, a federal court may vacate an
award where the arbitrator was aware of the applicable law yet
refused to apply it.146 Putting to one side the legitimacy of the
manifest disregard doctrine (a topic I have explored elsewhere), 147 the
question then becomes whether the manifest disregard doctrine
rescues the FAA from constitutional infirmity.

142. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
143. Indeed, nearly a century and a half ago, the Supreme Court seemed to envision this
state of affairs. In Burchell v. Marsh, the Supreme Court explained:
If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the
arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it
aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of
judgment of the chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties, and would
make an award the commencement, not the end, of litigation.
58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854) (emphasis added).
144. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Of course, manifest disregard need not be
the standard governing the relationship between arbitration and the courts. Other systems
utilize arbitrators more as referees or provide for de novo review of the arbitrator's decision. I am
grateful to Roderick McDonald's replique to my presentation at the McGill/University of
Montreal matinee on this point.
145. As I have explored elsewhere, a disagreement persists among the lower federal courts
over whether the manifest disregard of the law doctrine is available in enforcement actions
falling under the New York Convention. See Rutledge, supranote 52.
146. BORN, supra note 10, at 797-814.
147. Rutledge, supra note 52.
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While the issue is close, I ultimately conclude that ordinary
private commercial arbitration survives Article III challenge under
modified appellate review theory. Courts almost never review arbitral
awards for factual errors, yet modified appellate review theory
suggests that this does not present an Article III concern.1 48 As to
questions of constitutional law, the available review under the FAA
and the New York Convention suffices. In some cases, courts can rule
on constitutional issues at the outset of the arbitration by ruling on a
motion to compel arbitration or stay litigation. 149 In other cases, courts
can rule on constitutional issues when reviewing the arbitral award:
several of the above-mentioned standards under the New York
Convention or the FAA incorporate constitutional norms. For example,
both laws provide that an award can be denied enforcement (or
vacated under the FAA) in cases where a party lacked proper notice of
the arbitral proceedings. Courts applying these standards generally
have imported due process norms to evaluate those claims. 150 Thus,
under modified appellate review theory, the current regime provides
Article III courts with sufficient oversight of constitutional questions.
The trickiest aspect of the analysis here is the limited role of
Article III. This gap would be fatal to arbitration under the original
conception of appellate review theory. Once one rejects consent as an
escape hatch for the theory, federal courts are not conducting the de
novo review of nonconstitutional questions that the theory requires.
Nonetheless, under modified appellate review theory, the manifest
disregard doctrine arguably supplies the necessary degree of federal
appellate review. The voluntariness of the undertaking justifies a
reduced role for federal courts. At the same time, the manifest
disregard doctrine preserves a limited role for federal courts
vindicating the Article III values still present in an arbitration
scheme.
Ironically, the origins of the manifest disregard doctrine
strengthen this claim.1 5' The manifest disregard standard appears
nowhere in the FAA (or, for that matter, in any other statute or treaty
governing the enforcement of arbitral awards in the United States).
Rather, it traces its origins entirely to the Supreme Court's decisions,
almost as a type of federal common law governing the enforcement of

148. See BORN, supra note 10, at 794-814.
149. Id. at 208-16 (collecting cases for the proposition that courts can rule on a challenge to
an arbitration agreement as void on grounds of illegality).
150. Id. at 832-33, 841-49.
151. I am grateful to Jo Potuto for her thoughts on this point.
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awards. 152 This judicial pedigree affords a court greater flexibility to
shape its contours than if a statute constrained its interpretation.
While courts generally have been reluctant to vacate awards (or to
decline enforcement) on this ground, several recent noteworthy
decisions involving federal statutory claims have done so. 153 This trend
suggests that the doctrine is malleable enough to vindicate the Article
III values underpinning appellate review theory in this context.
While private commercial arbitration survives Article III
challenge under the modified appellate review theory, the scheme in
Thomas does not. 154 Compared to the judicial review governing private
commercial awards, judicial review under the FIFRA scheme in
Thomas was more limited. FIFRA reserved absolutely no role for
reviewing courts to evaluate the arbitrator's award, even where the
arbitrator manifestly disregards the law. The total lack of judicial
review over the merits of a dispute between two private parties cuts
too deeply into the separation of powers values animating Article III
review. Thus, like Fallon's original appellate review theory, the
modified theory offered here would reject the holding in Thomas.
Modified appellate review theory also offers some insights into
the ongoing debates about the enforceability of party-initiated efforts
to modify the scope of judicial review contractually, a topic that the
Supreme Court recently addressed in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc.155 In some cases, parties attempt to expand the grounds of
judicial review (for example by providing that the arbitrator's factual
findings shall be reviewed for clear error and the legal findings
reviewed de novo). 156 Under the logic of the theory presented here,
such clauses should be enforced, for they reenforce the separation of
powers values justifying a role for the judiciary in reviewing an award.
In this respect, Hall Street Associates may have been wrongly decided.

152. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995); Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (holding that parties bound by arbitrator's decision were not in "manifest
disregard" of the law), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
153. See, e.g., Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 237 (4th Cir. 2006)
(vacating award in age discrimination case).
154. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
155. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008) (holding that the only
justifications for vacating or modifying an arbitration award are those enumerated in the FAA
provisions). See generally CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 569-77 (2002)
(summarizing split in case law and commentary). Hall Street Assocs. was decided just before this
article went to press. Thus, any comments herein are preliminary.
156. See, e.g., Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997),
overruled by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003).
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In other cases, parties attempt to limit the grounds of judicial
review (for example, by subjecting the award to review under state
157
law grounds which may be narrower than those under the FAA).
Modified appellate review theory suggests that these clauses should
be unenforceable, because they further erode the judiciary's residual
role in policing awards before they are reduced to judgment.
The question is extremely close, but the manifest disregard
doctrine, in my opinion, saves private commercial arbitration from
constitutional defect. Its absence from the review scheme in Thomas,
however, renders that scheme unconstitutional.
2. NAFTA
Under Chapters 11 and 19 of NAFTA, the signatory countries
agree to
submit
disputes
over discriminatory
treatment,
expropriation, anti-dumping, and countervailing duties laws (following
15 8
an initial agency determination) to a binational panel of arbitrators.
With respect to disputes over imports into the United States, NAFTA
requires binational panels to choose U.S. law as the applicable
substantive rule of decision. In the event that a party disagrees with
the panel's determination, it may appeal the decision to an
extraordinary challenge committee. Following that committee's review
(or if no such committee is convened), the only recourse that a party
has to a federal court is to file a constitutional challenge. The
CanadianSoftwood Lumber case, which recently settled following oral
argument in the D.C. Circuit, involved such a challenge.' 59 Thus, even
though the interpretation of NAFTA is undoubtedly a federal
question, 60 a party may not seek review of the merits of a NAFTA
tribunal's determinations in an Article III court, apart from the
narrow exception for constitutional questions.

157. See, e.g., Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001).
158. For discussions of NAFTA's dispute resolution procedure, see Curtis A. Bradley,
InternationalDelegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1557, 1575-77 (2003); Chen, supranote 6, at 1465-79; Susan L. Karamanian, Dispute Resolution
Under NAFTA Chapter 11: A Response to the Critics, in CESARE ROMANO, THE UNITED STATES
AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (forthcoming 2008); Monaghan, supra note 6, at
837-39; Pfander, supra note 75, at 766-68.
159. See Coal. for Fair Lumber Imps., Executive Comm. v. United States, 471 F.3d 1329,
1330 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
160. "The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added); see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra
note 29, at 28-29 (describing how claims under treaties of the United States arise under federal
law).
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NAFTA arbitration also survives under appellate review
theory. 161 With respect to two types of findings, the analysis is quite
straightforward. A provision of the NAFTA implementing legislation
expressly grants the D.C. Circuit, an Article III Court, original
jurisdiction over facial constitutional challenges to NAFTA's
binational panel review system. 162 Additionally, the Court of
International Trade, also an Article III Court, has jurisdiction over
constitutional issues arising out of U.S. agency determinations that
implement binational panel decisions in countervailing duty and
antidumping cases.1 63 While neither NAFTA nor its implementing
legislation authorizes Article III review of a binational panel's factual
findings, appellate review theory-both in its original form advanced
by Fallon and in the modified form advanced here-does not find this
troublesome.
The more problematic aspect of NAFTA's system is the
complete lack of federal judicial review of any legal findings made by
binational panels. This clearly would be fatal to the NAFTA scheme
under Fallon's original appellate review theory.1 64 Under the modified
appellate review theory offered here, however, this limit is not fatal.
Evaluated by the flexible balance articulated in Part II, NAFTA
claims implicate principles of sovereign immunity. The Canadian
Softwood Lumber case, for example, technically involves an action by
U.S. companies against the U.S. government (and Canadian
intervenors). Barring a waiver, sovereign immunity principles would
foreclose any action, a result entirely consistent with Article 111.165
Thus, a scheme foreclosing judicial review of binational panels'
determinations of pure legal questions does not violate Article III.

161. Though not central to my thesis, I also believe that it would survive even under public
rights theory as the Court has articulated it. Jim Chen has offered a forceful attack on NAFTA,
arguing, among other things, that its dispute resolution system violates Article III. Chen, supra
note 6, at 1463.79. Central to Chen's Article III argument is his contention that the claims under
NAFTA constitute private rights. While powerful, Chen's argument ultimately cannot overcome
Ex ParteBakelite Corp.'sclear holding that claims against the government arising out of customs
determinations represent core public rights for which Congress can cut off Article III review
altogether. 279 U.S. 438, 460-61 (1929). Indeed, until 1979, Article III Courts had no jurisdiction
over customs determinations whatsoever. See Peter D. Ehrenhaft, The "Judicialization"of Trade
Law, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 595, 608 (1981).
162. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(A) (2000).
163. Id. § 1516a(g)(4)(B).
164. Pfander, supra note 75, at 767.
165. Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260 (1999) ("Absent a waiver,
sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit." (quoting FDIC
v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994))).
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3. Investment Arbitration
To facilitate the flow of capital to lesser developed countries,
the United States and other western nations have entered into more
than 2,000 BITs with capital importing countries. 166 A critical feature
of these treaties is that they protect the foreign investor against
expropriatory or other conduct. To substantiate this guarantee, many
BITs include offers by the capital-importing country to arbitrate any
expropriation claim often administered under the auspices of the
World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Dispute ("ICSID"). A critical feature distinguishing BIT awards from
other international commercial arbitral awards is that they do not
require an underlying agreement to arbitrate. Rather, the capitalimporting nation's treaty obligations suffice to subject the country to
the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. In an ICSID-administered
arbitration, an appellate arbitral panel reviews the initial panel
decision. Thereafter, if both countries are signatories, judicial review
is governed by the Washington Convention of 1965.167 Under that
convention, "awards are theoretically directly enforceable in signatory
states without any method of review in national courts." 168
Investment arbitration has some of the qualities of ordinary
international commercial arbitration but with three salient
differences. First, unlike international commercial arbitration,
investment arbitration does not involve a voluntary agreement
between the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration. Rather, the
submission arises from the pre-existing agreement of the capitalimporting country or the state-owned entity with which the foreign
investor is doing business.' 69 Second, unlike private commercial
166. For discussions of BIT arbitrations, see BORN, supra note
RUTLEDGE,

supra note

29, at

313-14; ALAN

REDFERN

ET AL.,

10, 191-95; BORN &

LAW

AND PRACTICE

OF

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 474-501 (4th ed. 2004); Andrea K. Bjorklund,
Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of Justice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT'L
L. 809 (2005); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
PrivatizingPublic InternationalLaw Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521
(2005) [hereinafter Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis]; Susan D. Franck, The Nature and
Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright
Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47 (2005).
167. For a discussion of the Washington Convention, see BORN, supra note 10, at 24-25. If
one of the countries is not a signatory to the Washington Convention, then either another
multilateral convention such as the New York Convention or, alternatively, the enforcement
country's arbitration law supplies the relevant standard on enforcement. See generally Franck,
The Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 166, at 1545-57.
168. BORN, supra note 10, at 25; see also Washington Convention, supra note 141, arts. 5354.
169. The non-contractual feature here resembles the system of compulsory arbitration in
Thomas described supra Part II.B. Notably, the Court in Thomas eschewed any effort to
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arbitration, investment arbitration implicates concerns of sovereign
immunity. As noted in the preceding section, both the voluntariness of
the undertaking and the presence of sovereign immunity weigh in the
value scale that determines the necessary degree of "adequately
searching appellate review." Third, judicial review is far more
circumscribed than in private international commercial arbitration.
With respect to questions of constitutional law and findings of
fact, the analysis of bilateral investment treaties does not differ
materially from the analysis of ordinary private commercial
arbitration. With respect to legal questions, however, the analysis is
markedly different for the above-noted reasons. The absence of privity
between the foreign sovereign and the investor suggests that greater
scrutiny is required. On the other hand, the presence of sovereign
immunity concerns reduces the need for plenary Article III review.
Here, of course, it is not the immunity of the United States, but the
immunity of the foreign sovereign, at issue. That immunity is the
subject of legislative grace-one that Congress can strip if it so
desires.1 7 0 Here too, the question is close. Ultimately Congress's
control over the foreign sovereign's immunity logically entails a power
to decide the scope of any judicial action over the sovereign. Because
Congress could restore the sovereign's immunity altogether, it
proceeds logically that it should be able to regulate the degree to
which the sovereign is amenable to suit in an Article III court. Given
the dominance of the sovereign immunity values here, investment
arbitrations, despite the limited review for legal errors, likewise pass
constitutional muster.
B. Criticism
This Section explores the criticisms of the modified appellate
review theory.
1. Choice-of-Forum Clauses
One potential criticism of the thesis presented here is its
171
implication for other efforts to shift disputes from Article III forums.
For example, courts generally have approved, within limits, parties'

characterize the arbitration as "voluntary" by reference to the prior decision to register the
pesticide with the EPA. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 577-78 (1985).
170. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 29, at 317-33.
171. I am especially grateful to Symeon Symeonides, Ralph Steinhardt, and Peter Murphy
for helping me work through this puzzle in the argument.
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use of choice-of-forum clauses to refer disputes to a foreign forum. 172 In
some cases, parties may combine the choice-of-forum clause with a
choice-of-law clause-thereby opting out of a jurisdiction's procedural
system and its substantive liability rules. 173 These efforts generally
have received judicial approval, albeit amid much academic
criticism. 174 Should international choice-of-forum clauses (whether
standing alone or coupled with choice-of-law clauses) survive the test
articulated here?
In fact, such cases fit quite comfortably within the theory. In
contrast to arbitral awards, the standards governing judicial review of
foreign judgments are more exacting; courts enjoy greater latitude to
decline to enforce foreign judgments that they find problematic,
including a robust public policy exception (permitting a review of the
substance of the judgment) and due process rules (permitting a review
of the procedures used to reach that judgment). 175 This greater
flexibility makes the forum selection/choice-of-law cases easier, not
1 76
harder, than the arbitration cases under appellate review theory.

172. See, e.g., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
173. See, e.g., Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). See
generally BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 29, at 493-500.
174. See generally BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 29, at 435-519. For academic criticism of
this trend in the jurisprudence governing forum selection and choice-of-law clauses, see Philip J.
McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A 'Second Look' at International
Commercial Arbitration, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1999).
175. For recent examples of courts relying on these more robust standards, see Yahoo!, Inc.
v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192-94 (N.D. Cal.
2001), rev'd on other grounds, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Bridgeway Corp. v.
Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276, 285-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000); Telnikoff
v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
176. The newly signed Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, however, may test
the limits of this argument. That convention tightens the obligations on courts to give effect to
choice-of-forum clauses and foreign judgments rendered thereto. As I have argued elsewhere, the
treaty (which the United States has signed but not yet ratified) could eliminate a major
difference in the legal regime governing judgment enforcement and award enforcement and,
consequently, require re-examination of the Article III questions explored here. See Peter B.
Rutledge, Post-Hague Hangover: Three PredictionsAbout the Future of the Law Governing the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, in EUROPEAN UNION ISSUES FROM A
PORTUGUESE PERSPECTIVE 107-25 (Marshal J. Breger & Markus G. Pruder eds., 2007)
To take the argument one step further, one might ponder its implications for settlement
agreements and consent decrees. Does the argument here require different treatment of those
efforts at "alternative dispute resolution"? For three reasons, I do not believe that these other
forms are completely analogous to arbitration agreements. First, with respect to settlement
agreements, no federal statute compels courts to reduce the agreement to a judgment (as is the
case with arbitral awards). Second, settlement agreements and consent decrees are more
properly understood as "post-dispute" attempts at settlement rather than "pre-dispute"
agreements about how to settle a case; under those circumstances, considerations of fairness are
less pronounced. Third, while the standards vary across jurisdictions and with the issue, the
degree of judicial review of these sorts of resolutions is more exacting and, thereby, promotes the
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2. The Voluntariness Line
A second potential criticism concerns the importance that the
theory places on the difference between voluntary and involuntary
agreements. A rich literature has argued that certain arbitration
agreements, particularly cases where the parties enjoy unequal
bargaining power (such as consumer contracts and employment
agreements), should not be understood as voluntary. Rather, they
should be deemed contracts of adhesion where the use of a standard
form arbitration clause in an industry is so rampant that the party
with the inferior bargaining position cannot be said to have engaged in
free choice.
This argument presents a potentially formidable objection to
the theory presented here, particularly in the context of domestic
arbitrations involving statutory claims (such as in Title VII or the
Truth in Lending Act). Nonetheless, I do not think that it jeopardizes
the theory for two main reasons.
First, as I have argued elsewhere, it would be a mistake to
characterize these arbitrations as involuntary. 177 Narrowing the
definition of "voluntary" to exclude agreements of this sort could
undermine valuable public policies that benefit both sides in these
kinds of transactions, including the party with the lesser bargaining
power. For example, law and economics theory suggests companies
that can reduce their dispute resolution costs through arbitration
clauses can pass on those savings in the form of reduced prices to their
customers.17 8 Such benefits obviously would be lost if agreements of
this sort were deemed involuntary and the judicial review found
inadequate under appellate review theory.
Second, it bears emphasis that the objection flows from the
exceptional "one size fits all" approach typical of arbitration in the
United States. That is, so long as something qualifies as "arbitration"
in the United States, the governing law does not meaningfully
distinguish arbitrations between commercially sophisticated parties
and arbitrations between parties with distinctly different bargaining
positions. Here, we can draw a lesson from Europe. European systems
have very different arbitration laws governing commercial

Article III values. See generally Sanford I. Weisburst, Judicial Review of Settlements and
Consent Decrees: An Economic Analysis, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1999) (describing the differing
degrees of judicial deference to party-initiated settlement).
177. See Rutledge, supra note 128, at 158.
178. Anecdotal evidence from the credit card lends some support to this hypothesis, though
the data are scarce. See Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair"Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 695, 742-48.
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arbitrations and consumer or employment arbitrations. The solution
to such cases, therefore, may lie not in jettisoning the
voluntariness/involuntariness line as a matter of constitutional
doctrine but, instead, in carving out categories of cases where the
disparities in bargaining power are most severe.
At bottom, though, I candidly acknowledge this vulnerability in
the argument. Further empirical research may undercut the economic
hypothesis. Moreover, that hypothesis may not necessarily be valid in
other contexts, such as employment contracts, where it is far from
clear that the economic benefits from arbitration of employmentrelated claims yield substantial advantages to the employee. If this
were not the case-and such agreements properly were deemed
"involuntary"-then I freely admit that, under the logic of the
argument presented here, there would be a heightened need for
exacting judicial review of any award. This could come, for example,
from strengthening of the manifest disregard doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION

The decline of the jurisdictional ouster and non-arbitrability
doctrines has given rise to a host of new questions about the
relationship between arbitration and the Constitution, including the
compatibility of arbitration with Article III. Despite the salient
differences between arbitration and other non-Article III schemes that
the Supreme Court has approved, courts have mechanically rejected
Article III attacks on constitutional schemes. While the sparse
academic literature admits greater skepticism, those accounts also
provide an inadequate explanation. In contrast to these efforts,
appellate review theory, grounded in a careful balancing of values,
provides the most useful tool for evaluating the constitutionality of
arbitration. The theory is not flawless and, as originally designed,
yields conflicting answers to the question. Nonetheless, a more flexible
approach, one entirely consistent with appellate review theory's
underlying principles, is possible. Once refined to reflect a more
flexible balancing of values, appellate review theory yields a more
coherent system for evaluating arbitral schemes-one that adequately
explains the constitutionality of both private and public international
arbitration.

